PFX v XKJ (Foreign Divorce: Financial Relief Jurisdiction) [2026] 1 HKLRD 599; [2025] HKFC 154 (Eugene Yim, Fiona Chong)

Eugene Yim and Fiona Chong represented the Respondent in PFX v XKJ (Foreign Divorce: Financial Relief Jurisdiction) [2025] 6 HKC 559, [2025] HKFC 154.

H and W married in Chongqing, the Mainland (the PRC) in 2008, where they were born. At all material times during the marriage, the family resided in Chongqing. H and W had two daughters who studied in the PRC before going to Canada for further study in 2023. H surrendered his Chinese nationality in 2017 but remained resident in Chongqing. H and W became Hong Kong permanent residents in 2021 through investing in securities under the Capital Investment Entrant Scheme. H had substantial assets including C, a BVI company. In December 2022, H and W divorced in Chongqing. H and W signed an agreement concerning the daughters and the financial arrangements upon divorce, which was formally registered in the PRC court (the PRC Divorce Agreement). In April 2024, W made an ex parte application without notice for Pt.IIA leave to apply for financial relief after divorce outside Hong Kong under s.29AC of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (Cap.192) (the MPPO), which was granted by the Court in July 2024. W then commenced proceedings pursuant to the Pt.IIA leave. H now applied for, inter alia, the setting aside of the leave and for dismissal of the proceedings for want of jurisdiction. To establish jurisdiction under Pt.IIA MPPO, an applicant had to prove either: (i) domicile in Hong Kong; or (ii) habitual residence in Hong Kong; or (iii) a substantial connection with Hong Kong (s.29AE(a)-(c)). The key issue was whether either H and W had a “substantial connection” with Hong Kong on the date of the leave application or divorce under s.29AE(c) MPPO. W argued that, since an application under Pt.IIA was made after the marriage had already been dissolved in a foreign jurisdiction, “substantial connection” under s.29AE(c) only focused on the parties’ financial arrangements during and arising out of the marriage. W submitted that the meaning of the term differed from that in s.3 of the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance (Cap.179) (the MCO) which concerned divorce jurisdiction and under the Parent and Child Ordinance (Cap.429) (the PCO) which concerned jurisdiction for declaration of parentage.

Held, setting aside the ex parte leave granted under Pt.IIA of the MPPO and dismissing W’s application for want of jurisdiction, that:

(1) The meaning of “substantial connection” in the context of Pt.IIA leave under s.29AE(c) MPPO was the same as that in the context of the Hong Kong court’s divorce jurisdiction under s.3 MCO. The interpretation of “substantial connection” in other family legislations such as the MCO and the PCO which were in pari materia should be adopted in interpreting the same term in s.29AE(c) MPPO. Such approach avoided inconsistent interpretation of “substantial connection” across family legislations and was supported by legislative materials which showed the legislative intent of s.29AE MPPO to align the jurisdictional requirements with that under s.3 MCO. Moreover, the enquiry under s.29AE MPPO not only focused on financial matters. Before ordering financial relief under Pt.IIA, the court had the duty to consider all the circumstances under s.29AF(1) MPPO, including the factors listed under s.29AF(2) which included general, personal and financial factors (CMU v WPM (Part IIA Application) [2012] HKFLR 245, Re WSJ (Minor) (Parentage: jurisdiction) [2019] 1 HKLRD 977, M v G [2022] HKFLR 475 applied). (See paras.32-43.)

(2) The court adopted a holistic approach and evaluated all the relevant factors to determine whether either of the parties had a substantial connection to Hong Kong as at the date of the leave application or divorce. In most cases, whether the parties had substantially conducted their family life in Hong Kong would be the focus of the inquiry and a material factor. It was only in infrequent cases that substantial connection could be established without presence of the family in Hong Kong (ZC v CN [2014] 5 HKLRD 43, ZJW v SY [2017] HKFLR 612, CN v YTW [2020] HKFC 146, JQ v CLH (Divorce: Jurisdiction) [2022] 2 HKLRD 632 applied). (See paras.44-48.)

(3) Physical presence was an important factor. The frequency, length and purpose of the parties’ stay in Hong Kong were also relevant factors. H and W were not physically present in Hong Kong at the specified dates and did not spend a very long time in Hong Kong (ZC v CN [2014] 5 HKLRD 43 applied). (See paras.51-58.)

(4) The parties’ social presence in Hong Kong was very weak and not substantial. The daughters never attended school in Hong Kong; H and W had not maintained any memberships, community ties, social networks or connections in Hong Kong; had not purchased landed property in Hong Kong despite having substantial assets; and had not engaged in any business or work in Hong Kong; while the family life had been conducted in the PRC at all material times. An alleged plan to relocate to Hong Kong had never been carried out (CN v YTW [2020] HKFC 146 considered). (See paras.59-68.)

(5) The parties’ economic presence in Hong Kong was very weak and not substantial. C’s bank accounts were located overseas; H did not operate C’s accounts in Hong Kong or through Hong Kong financial institutions; H’s Hong Kong assets were at most about 3% of his total assets; H never maintained any credit cards in Hong Kong; and neither party had paid any tax or received any income in Hong Kong (Re Guangdong International Trust & Investment Corp Hong Kong (Holdings) Ltd [2018] 5 HKLRD 396 considered). (See paras.69-86.)

(6) In contrast, the parties’ connections in the PRC were much more substantial. H and W owned landed properties in the PRC; the daughters had been educated in the PRC prior to moving to Canada; and the parties’ parents resided in Chongqing (ZC v CN [2014] 5 HKLRD 43 applied). (See paras.87-89.)

(7) Accordingly, the Pt.IIA leave granted should be set aside. W’s application should be dismissed for want of jurisdiction. In all the relevant circumstances, the parties’ presence in Hong Kong were of a transitory nature. Neither party had a substantial connection to Hong Kong. (See para.90.)

(8) (Obiter) In an application to set aside ex parte Pt.IIA leave, the court must decide afresh whether, in all the circumstances of the case and having regard in particular to the matters in s.29AF(2) MPPO, there is substantial ground for granting leave for the application for financial relief. The burden remains on the applicant to show leave ought to be granted. There is no requirement for the respondent to meet any high threshold of showing a “knockout blow” such as a material misdirection or a new decisive authority to set aside leave (Potanina v Potanin [2024] AC 1063 applied; Agbaje v Agbaje [2010] UKSC 13 not followed). (See paras.91, 93-97.)

(9) (Obiter) Even if either of the parties had a substantial connection to Hong Kong, upon considering the leave application afresh, the Court would still have decided not to grant leave taking into account all the circumstances including the factors listed in s.29AF(2) MPPO. W and the daughters had received adequate financial benefit under the Agreement, most of the terms of which H had duly complied with; W could have applied for financial relief in PRC; H’s Hong Kong assets constituted only 3% of his total assets; W failed to prove that any award of the Hong Kong court could be enforced in relation to H’s foreign assets; and W delayed in applying for leave. (See paras.98-120.)

Application

This was an application by the respondent husband for the setting aside of ex parte leave and dismissal of proceedings for want of jurisdiction in the wife’s application for financial relief after divorce outside Hong Kong under Pt.IIA of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (Cap.192).

[The above is excerpted from the headnote to the report in HKLRD.]